Infectious Disease Management

Insights from simple models

The Anatomy of an Epidemic

Initially, exponential growth (proportional to R_0)

But, depletes susceptibles, so R_0 no longer useful

Instead, define effective value of R_0 (call it R_e)

R_e scales with proportion of susceptibles in population (s=X/N), ie $R_e = R_0 s$

when R_e<1, each infectious individual infects fewer than one new person, breaking transmission chain



Vaccination

If, by vaccination, we can reduce proportion of susceptibles below a critical level, S_c, then $R_e<1$ and infection can never 'invade'

Recall: $R_e = R_0 X/N$

So, $S_c=1/R_0$ represents $R_e=1$ and will achieve our goal

So, critical vaccination proportion to eradicate is

$p_c = 1-S_c = 1-1/R_0$



Mathematically ...

- Consider rate of change of invectives:

$$\frac{dY}{dt} = \beta X \frac{Y}{N} - \gamma Y$$

- Hence, preventing initial spread (dY/dt <0) requires

$$\beta \frac{X}{N} < \gamma$$

$$\Longrightarrow \frac{X}{N} < \frac{\gamma}{\beta} = \frac{1}{R_0}$$

Eradication Criterion

$$p_c = 1 - \frac{1}{R_0}$$

Smallpox

Polio

Measles



Herd immunity:

protection of an individual from infection via others in population gaining immunity

If neighbors have been vaccinated, probability of acquiring disease is lower

Don't need to vaccinate everyone to eradicate an infectious disease

Extent of vaccination effort determined by simple quantity, R_0

1. "Paediatric immunization"

- *Familiar with infant immunization*
- *Generally treated as fraction, p, of newborns vaccinated*

at birth	HepB
2 months	HepB (1-2 mos) + DTaP + PCV13 + Hib + Polio + RV
4 months	DTaP + PCV13 + Hib + Polio + RV
6 months	HepB (6-18 mos) + DTaP + PCV13 + Hib + Polio (6-18 mos) + RV
12 Months	MMR (12-15 mos) + PCV13 (12-15 mos) + Hib (12-15 mos) + Varicella (12-15 mos) + HepA (12-23 mos)
15 months	DTaP (15-18 mos)



1. "Paediatric immunization"

- *Model this (as one time event)*

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \mu(1-p) - \beta SI - \mu S$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - (\mu + \gamma)I$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \mu p + \gamma I - \mu R$$

- *Now what?*
- *Let's derive expression for I**

"Paediatric immunization"

- *After some algebra:*
  - $I^* = \mu/\beta\ (R_0(1-p) - 1)$
- *Eradication implies $I^*=0$*
- *Requires $p = 1-1/R_0$*

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \mu(1-p) - \beta SI - \mu S$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - (\mu + \gamma)I$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \mu p + \gamma I - \mu R$$

- *This is **fraction** of newborns to be immunized for (eventual) control*

2. Random Immunization



- *Consider wildlife diseases*
- *How would you vaccinate newborns?*
- *Pragmatically, will need continuous vaccination instead*

"Random immunization"

- *After some algebra:*
  - $I^* = \mu/\beta\ (R_0 - 1 - \rho/\mu)$
- *Again, eradication* $\rightarrow I^* = 0$
- *Requires* $\rho \geq \mu(R_0 - 1)$
- *This is* ***rate*** *of susceptibles to be immunized for (eventual) control*
- *What does criterion tell us, biologically?*

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \mu - \beta SI - \mu S - \rho S$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - (\mu + \gamma)I$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \rho S + \gamma I - \mu R$$

Note*: at eradication threshold,* $\rho_c S^*$ *individuals vaccinated per unit time,*

$\mu(R_0 - 1) * 1/R_0$

$= \mu(1 - 1/R_0)$

Identical to infant immunization

3. "Pulsed" Vaccination

- *Infant & Continuous vaccinations require sound infrastructure for vaccine delivery*
  - *unlikely to be case in many developing nations*
- *Alternative, perhaps more economic and logistically efficient strategy may be pulsed vaccination: immunize specific age cohorts at specified intervals*

Pulsed Vaccination



- *Assume R_0 = 10*
- *p_V = 60% and per capita annual birth rate = 2%*
- *For dI/dt<0, need to ensure S < 1/10*
- *After any pulse, S = 1/10 * 0.4 = 0.04*
- *Since μ=0.02, it'll take 3 years for S to reach 0.1*
- *So, pulse period = 3 yrs*

More formally …

- *For an SIR model:*

Vaccination fraction

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \mu - \beta SI - \mu S - p_V \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} S(nT^-)\,\delta(t - nT)$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - (\mu + \gamma)I$$

Susceptibles prior to PV *Dirac delta function*

- *Shulgin et al. (1998; Bull Math Biol): Linear stability analysis reveals eradication criterion*

$$\frac{(\mu T - p_V)(e^{\mu T} - 1) + \mu p_V T}{\mu T(p_V - 1 + e^{\mu T})} < \frac{1}{R_0}$$



Programming Challenge:



Aside: Imperfect Vaccines

- *What if –as is at times the case– immunity derived from a vaccine wanes over time?*



$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \mu(1-p) - \beta SI - \mu S + \delta V$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - (\mu + \gamma)I$$

$$\frac{dV}{dt} = \mu p - (\mu + \delta)V$$

Aside: Imperfect Vaccines

- *What if –as is at times the case– immunity derived from a vaccine wanes over time?*

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \mu(1-p) - \beta SI - \mu S + \delta V$$
$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - (\mu + \gamma)I$$
$$\frac{dV}{dt} = \mu p - (\mu + \delta)V$$

Eradication requires (Check this)

$$p = \left(1 - \frac{1}{R_0}\right)\left(1 + \frac{\delta}{\mu}\right)$$



Eradication will require boosters

4. Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions

- *"Social distancing"*
- *Isolation and quarantining*
- *We should also find (or trace) their contacts*





Background

- Pandemic planning
  - Consider emerging pathogen
  - Everyone susceptible
  - No pharmaceutical defense (drugs/vaccines)
  - Only Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions would work
- Social distancing
  - How long?
  - What extent?

Protocol

- Basic reproduction ratio $R_0 = 1.8$
- Recovery rate $\gamma = 1/2.6$ day^{-1}
  - Generation time 2.6 days
- Baseline transmission rate $\beta_0 = R_0 \gamma$
- Population size $n = 58.1$ million (UK)



Intervention D=12 weeks



Intervention $\phi = 0.333$
Start (week)

- A: $T_1 = 3$
- B: $T_1 = 5$
- C: $T_1 = 6$
- D: $T_1 = 7$



Intervention D=12 weeks



- Start (week)
  $T_1 = 5$
- Intervention

E: $\phi = 0.111$
F: $\phi = 0.222$
B: $\phi = 0.333$
G: $\phi = 0.444$

Intervention D=12 weeks



Depending on aims of control, efforts that are too early or too severe may be counter-productive

Contact-tracing & isolation

- *Assume average contact rate,* κ
- *Transmission probability,* ν
- *Infectious individuals immediately symptomatic*
- *Infectious isolated at rate* d_I
- *Fraction q of contacts with infectious quarantined*
- *Kept in quarantine for average* τ_Q

Modeling NPI

Contact, transmission — *Contact, no transmission, quarantine* — *Released quarantine*

Susceptible

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -(\kappa\nu + q\kappa(1-\nu))SI + \tau_Q S_Q$$

Susceptible in quarantine

Infectious

Infectious in quarantine

Recovered

Contact, transmission, not traced

Isolation

Contact, transmission, traced

Modeling NPI

Contact, transmission — *Contact, no transmission, quarantine* — *Released quarantine*

Susceptible

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -(\kappa\nu + q\kappa(1-\nu))SI + \tau_Q S_Q$$

Susceptible in quarantine

$$\frac{dS_Q}{dt} = q\kappa(1-\nu)SI - \tau_Q S_Q$$

Infectious

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \kappa\nu(1-q)SI - d_I I - \gamma I$$

Infectious in quarantine

$$\frac{dQ}{dt} = \kappa\nu qSI + d_I I - \tau_Q Q$$

Recovered

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \gamma I + \tau_Q Q$$

Contact, transmission, not traced

Isolation

Contact, transmission, traced

What does it tell us?

- *Can show control requires* $S < \dfrac{(d_I + \gamma)}{k\nu(1-q)}$



$R_0 = 5$

$\tau_Q = 21\ d$

Yes, but …

Key realities we've ignored:

1. *Assumed infectious individuals immediately symptomatic (often, clinical presentation a few days after infectiousness, eg SARS)*
2. *Uncertainties & delays in identifying and isolating potential contacts*



Figure 4. Studies of viral shedding in SARS patients on various days following the onset of clinical symptoms, in stool (dark-grey bars), urine (white bars) and naso-pharangeal aspirate (light-grey bars) (Peiris *et al.* 2003*a*).

Yes, but …

- *Fraser et al. (2004; PNAS) examined 'controllability' of an infectious disease, based on epidemiology and pathogenesis*

Infectious disease with much 'silent' transmission are harder to control this way



Yes, another but …

- ***Back to our NPI example:***
  - *If contact tracing and quarantining efficient enough, invasion can be controlled*
  - *But …*
  - *Let's consider remaining susceptible population, post-control*
  - *NPI measures leave population vulnerable to re-exposure*

Fraction susceptible after outbreak



Lecture Summary …

- *Models can generate predictions about immunization levels required for eradication*
- *Similarly, extent of non-pharmaceutical interventions can be gauged*
- *NPIs leave many susceptibles behind*
  - *Important for re-introductions*
- *Infections with much silent transmission very difficult to control with NPIs*